Chapter XV
Endnotes

1 This chapter was originally prepared in Japanese by Maj. Hiroshi Komatsu, Imperial Japanese Army. For duty assignments of this officer, cf. n. 1, Chapter XIV. All source materials cited in this chapter are located in G-2 Historical Section Files, GHQ FEC.

2 Senkun Tokuho Dai Yonjuyon-go; Ruson To Sakusen ni okeru Kyokun narabini Keika no Gaiyo (Battle Lessons Special Report No. 44: Summary of Operations and Battle Lessons, Luzon Campaign) Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section, 29 Mar 45, pp. 34-5. (Japanese sources are either vague or in error with regard to the time of the enemy landings. Therefore, the time given here is based on Allied operational records.)

3 Statement by Lt. Col. Masaichi Takahashi, Staff Officer (Operations), 23d Division.

4 At the time of the Japanese invasion of the Philippines in December 1941, the beaches in the southern part of Lingayen Gulf around Dagupan and the town of Lingayen had been rejected as unsuitable for a landing because the marshy terrain of the coastal area would impede an advance inland. For the same reason it was thought unlikely that an American invasion force would execute major landings in this sector. (1) Cf. Chapter VI, Plate No. 17. (21 Unpublished memoirs of Lt. Gen. Akira Muto, Chief of Staff, Fourteenth Area Army: Hitosen no Jisso The Truth of the Philippines Campaign) 15 Jun 47, p. 33.

5 Statement by Maj. Gen. Haruo Konuma, Deputy-Chief of Staff, Fourteenth Area Army.

6 Cf. Chapter XIV, pp. 432-3. Most of the division main strength was to move via Calumpit because the highway network leading directly west from Cabanatuan to Tarlac included bridges too weak to support the heavier elements. An alternative route skirting around to the north via Talavera, Guimba and Gerona was ruled out because its use might expose the division to a flank attack in the event of a rapid enemy drive inland.

7 Following receipt of this order, the 2d Armored Division ordered the 6th Tank Regiment, which was still in the Manila area, to move north and rejoin the division. For a brief period the regiment had been attached to the Manila Defense Force but was returned to division control about 6 January.

8 On the basis of shore observation reports, 20 to 30 enemy ships were believed sunk in this attack. Summary of Operations and Battle Lessons, Luzon Campaign, op. cit., p. 35. (Actual results according to American naval records were two ships sunk and eight damaged.

9 Despite the Area Army order of 5 January (Cf. Chapter XIV, p. 430.) directing the 23d Division to make these first line defenses its main line of resistance, the division by 11 January had augmented the forces in the forward line by only one additional infantry company and half a battery of artillery. The 64th Infantry, reinf., held the segment of the line running from southwest of Sison to Manaoag, while the 2d Battalion, reinf., 71st Infantry, designated the Omori Detachment, held the south flank anchor positions in the Cabaruan Hills.

10 The Fourteenth Area Army staff deliberations of 10-11 January regarding tactical policy are assumed on the basis of statement by Maj. Gen. Konuma, previously cited.

11 By the time this order was issued, the division headquarters had moved only as far as Talavera, a short distance north of Cabanatuan, while the advance elements were just north of San Jose.

12 Shobu Sakumei Ko Dai Sambyakuhachijuyon-go (Fourteenth Area Army Operations Order No. A-384) 11 Jan 45.

13 The Area Army estimated at this time that the enemy would start his advance inland momentarily and that it would take the form of a two-pronged drive, one prong heading south from Lingayen toward Manila, and the other southeast from San Fabian toward San Jose. (Statement by Maj. Gen. Konuma, previously cited.

14 Ibid.

15 The Shigemi Detachment, ordered on 7 January to proceed to Urdaneta to bolster the 23d Division south flank, reached the vicinity of San Manuel by 10 January, when an Area Army order placed it under 23d Division control. On 12 January the 23d Division ordered the detachment to move up to Binalonan and Urdaneta, but this movement was delayed. Composition of the detachment was as follows:

Headquarters, 3d Tank Brigade

7th Tank Regt. (less 2d Tank Co.)

1st Bn. (less 1st Co. and one MG plat.), 2d Mobile Inf. Regt.

3d Bn. (less 8th Btry.), 2d Mobile Arty. Regt.

3d Co. (less one plat.), 2d Armored Division Engr. Unit

2d Co., 2d Armored Division Maint. Unit

16 23d Division Operations Order No. A-60, 1800 14 Jan 45. I Corps ADVATIS Translation ICAET 0027, 21 Jan 45

17 Summary of Operations and Battle Lessons, Luzon Campaign, op. cit., pp. 53-5. (2) Dai Nijusan Shidan (Asahi Heidan) Reika Butai Kodo Gaiyo [Summary of Operations, 23d Division (Asahi Force)] Home Depot Division, Mar 48, p. 26.

18 Fourteenth Area Army had already acted to strengthen these secondary defenses by drawing troops from the 19th Division to the north. On or about 11 January, the 2d Battalion, 75th Infantry, and the 1st Battalion, 73d Infantry, were ordered under 23d Division control for the purpose of reinforcing the defenses in the vicinity of Camp One. The 1st Battalion, 73d Infantry, was subsequently replaced by the 2d Battalion of the same regiment. (Statement by Maj. Gen. Konuma, previously cited.)

19 General Yamashita cited the entire 64th Infantry for its valiant defense of the first line positions. Summary of Operations, 23d Division (Asahi Force), op. cit., pp. 13-4.

20 The main strength of the 10th Reconnaissance Regiment, 10th Division, was disposed in the vicinity of San Nicolas. Patrols of the same regiment were posted in the Triangle Hill sector.

21 Shobu Sakumei Ko Dai Yonhyakujusan-go (Fourteenth Area Army Operations Order No. A-413) 15 Jan 45.

22 Ibid.

23 Shobu Sakumei Ko Dai Yonhyakunijuyon-go   (Fourteenth Area Army Operations Order No. A-424) 15 Jan 45.

24 Statement by Maj. Gen. Konuma, previously cited.

25 (1) Summary of Operations and Battle Lessons, Luzon Campaign, op. cit., p. 65. (2) An order issued by the Shigemi Detachment commander at San Manuel on 20 January declared: "The detachment will defend its present position to the death. The enemy must be annihilated." I Corps ADVATIS Translation ICAET 0037, 27 Jan 45.

26 Cf. Chapter XIV, p. 422.

27 Under the 19-20 December plans, the 10th Division was to be reinforced by the attachment of the Tsuda Detachment (11th Independent Infantry Regiment, reinf., 26th Division), but this unit was to continue its mission of securing the Baler and Dingalan Bay sectors against an enemy landing. The main strength of the detachment was relieved of this mission and ordered to Bongabong by Area Army order on 8 January, but the detachment did not come under 10th Division command until 10 January.

28 Tetsu (10th Division) Operations Order No. A-54, 10 Jan 45. I Corps ADVATIS Translation ICAET 0 185, 25 Apr 45. This order also directed organization of an Advance Force, composed of one infantry company, two artillery batteries, one and a half antitank companies, and one machine-gun platoon. This force was to remain in positions just north of San Jose.

29 Statements by Maj. Shigeharu Asaeda, Staff Officer (Operations), Fourteenth Area Army, and Maj. Gen. Konuma, previously cited.

30 Shobu Sakumei Ko Dai Yonhyakusanjuyon-go (Fourteenth Area Army Operations Order No. A-434) 20 Jan 45. (Plate No.114)

31 Effective 21 January, the Shigemi Detachment reverted to 2d Armored Division command by order of Fourteenth Area Army. (Statement by Maj. Gen. Konuma, previously cited.

32 Two factors were jointly responsible for the resort made by the 2d Armored Division to the practice of imbedding tanks in the ground as fixed defenses. The first was complete enemy control of the air, which made movement over the roads and highways next to impossible. The second was the fact that cross-country movement by armor was impossible in areas covered by rice-paddies. The employment of tanks as dug-in pill-boxes was considered highly effective on the basis of results achieved. (Statement by Lt. Col. Shigeo Kawai, Staff Officer (Operations), 2d Armored Division.)

33 Ibid.

34 (1) Ibid. (2) Radio, Loth Reconnaissance Regiment commander to Chief of Staff, 10th Division, 29 Jan 45. I Corps ADVATIS Translation ICAET 0184, 24 Apr 45.

35 The force dispatched to Munoz was commanded by the 6th Tank Regiment commander, Col. Kumpei Ida, and was designated the Ida Detachment. It began moving out of the Triangle Hill sector on 24 January and reached Munoz the following day. (1) Ida Detachment Operations Order No. 120, 24 Jan 45. I Corps ADVATIS Translation ICAET 0047, 3 Feb 45. (2) Ida Detachment Operations Order No. 122, 25 Jan 45. I Corps ADVATIS Translation ICAET 0049, 4 Feb 45.

36 Sbobu Sakumei Ko Dai Yonhyakurokuju-go (Fourteenth Area Army Operations Order No. A-460) 26 Jan 45. (By the provisions of this order, the 10th Reconnaissance Regiment defending the entrance to the Villa Verde Trail north of San Nicolas reverted from 2d Armored Division to 10th Division control.)

37 Four tanks belonging to the Omuro Detachment succeeded in breaking through the enemy encirclement and escaped along the highway to Umingan. (Statement by Lt. Col. Kawai, previously cited.)

38 This unit was one of the five infantry battalions of the 105th Division being transferred to the north. Placed under 2d Armored Division command upon its arrival in the San Jose area, it was ordered to proceed immediately to Umingan, where it arrived on 29 January, just before the enemy attack.

39 Composition of the Ida Detachment was as follows:

Headquarters, 6th Tank Regt.

3d, 4th and 5th Cos., 6th Tank Regt.

8th Btry., 2d Mobile Arty. Regt.

356th Ind. Inf. Bn. (less 2 cos.)

(1) 2d Armored Division Operations Order No. A-88, 7 Jan 45, Annex 1. ADVATIS Bulletin No. 307, 20 Feb 45, pp. 3-4. (2) 6th Tank Regiment Order No. 135, 2 Feb 45. ATIS Bulletin No. 1971, 18 Apr 45, p. 5.

40 For its determined defense of Munoz, the Ida Detachment was subsequently cited by Fourteenth Area Army. (Statement by Lt. Col. Kawai, previously cited.)

41 The 105th Division completed its reassembly in the area north of Puncan by about 2 February and immediately began preparing for a further move northward pursuant to an Area Army order issued on 29 January, which directed the division to proceed to the Bagabag area. The division now retained control of only three of its five infantry battalions, since one battalion had been released to the 2d Armored Division upon arrival in the San Jose area, and another had been transferred to the 10th Division to reinforce the latter's advance positions north of San Jose. Under the Area Army order of 29 January, one additional battalion was to be transferred to the 2d Armored Division, but the confused situation prevented the transfer from being carried out, and the battalion therefore remained with the 105th Division. To make up for the reduction of the division strength, the Area Army order of 29 January called for the transfer to 105th Division control of the loth Infantry, which had arrived at Bagabag from Aparri on 25 January. (1) Shobu Sakumei Ko Dai Yonhyakurokujuhachi-go (Fourteenth Area Army Operations Order No. A-468) 29 Jan 45. (2) Statement by Lt. Col. Hideaki Kitagawa, Staff Officer (Operations), 105th Division.

42 Statement by Maj. Gen. Konuma, previously cited.

43 Enemy forces had begun attacking Lupao on 30 January and San Isidro on 2 February. (Statement by Lt. Col. Kawai, previously cited.)

44 Ibid.

45 A draft Army-Navy Local Agreement proposed by Fourteenth Area Army at the time of the formulation of the 19-20 December defense plans was never finalized. This draft stipulated that all Army and Navy airfield units in the Clark Field sector should be commanded by the ranking air commander present. Cf. Chapter XIV, p. 423.

46 Maj. Gen. Tsukada became the highest ranking commander in the Clark Field sector with the departure of the First Air Fleet Commander on 9 January.

47 Maj. Gen. Tsukada's forces were made responsible for operations west of the line Calumpit-Pampanga River-Licab-Guimba-San Antonio-Santo Tomas, including all of Bataan Peninsula except the southern tip around Mariveles. The 11 January order rescinded an earlier Area Army order of the 8th assigning this zone to the 2d Armored Division. Maj. Gen. Tsukada was to operate under direct Area Army command and not under Fourth Air Army. Fourteenth Area Army Operations Order No. A-384, 11 Jan 45, op. cit. (Plate No. 115)

48 Ibid.

49 Order of battle of Army and Navy forces in the Clark Field area as of 17 January (battalion level and above) was as follows

(1) 1st Airborne Raiding Group Operations Order No. A-24, 17 Jan 45. XIV Corps ADVATIS Translation XIVCAET 0038, 2 Feb 45. (2) Hito Sakusen Kiroku Dai Sanki Dai Sankan Furoku Dai Ni Kuraku Chiku Kembu Shudan no Sakusen (Philippine Operations Record, Phase Three, Vol. III Supplement 2: Kembu Group Operations in the Clark Sector) 1st Demobilization Bureau, Nov 46, pp. 14-18. (3) Hito Homen Kaigun Sakusen Sono Shi (Philippine Area Naval Operations, Part IV) 2d Demobilization Bureau, Dec 48, pp. 46-7.

50 Outline of Troop Dispositions. XIV Corps ADVATIS Translation XIVCAET 0038, Separate Sheet, 2 Feb 45.

51 1st Airborne Raiding Group Operations Order No. A-24, 17 Jan 45. XIV ADVATIS Translation XIVCAET 0038, 2 Feb 45.

52 Philippine Area Naval Operations, Part IV, op. Cit., p. 49.

53 Statement by Col. Yasuji Okada, Chief of Staff, 1st Airborne Raiding Group.

54 Philippine Operations Record, Phase Three, op. Cit. Vol. III Suppl. 2, Attached Map.

55 Statement by Col. Okada, previously cited.

56 Philippine Operations Record, Phase Three, op. cit. Vol. III Suppl. 2, pp. 20-1.

57 During late February and March, the Japanese forces continued to execute a series of delaying actions which culminated in a withdrawal to the eastern base of Mt. Pinatubo. Here, on 6 April, the Kembu Group commander ordered his remaining troops to disperse and operate as guerrillas. Ibid., pp. 30-2.

58 Order of battle of the Nagayoshi Detachment as of the date of the enemy landing near San Antonio was as follows:

Main strength of the detachment (Hq., 3d Bn., 39th Infantry; one prov. inf. Co.; and engr. troops) was disposed on northern Bataan, to the east of Olongapo. The 2d Battalion and one provisional infantry company were in the area east of Bagac, on the west coast. (1) Bataan Detachment Disposition Sketch, 17 Dec 44. XI Corps ADVATIS Translations XICAET 0032, 16 Feb 45. (2) Statement by Col. Sanenobu Nagayoshi, 39th Infantry Regiment commander.

59 After taking Dinalupihan, the enemy sent elements down the east coast of Bataan to Balanga. From Balanga a force advanced inland along the road crossing the peninsula to Bagac and attacked the Nagayoshi Detachment elements occupying positions to the east of Bagac. These elements withdrew northward to Mt. Natib, where they joined the remnants of the detachment main strength retreating from the north. (Statement by Col. Nagayoshi, previously cited.)

60 Statement by Col. Shujiro Kobayashi, Staff Officer (Operations), Shimbu Group. (This officer, previously senior operations staff officer in Fourteenth Area Army headquarters, was temporarily assigned to duty on the staff of Shimbu Group headquarters when it was organized late in December.)

61 Action to place the naval ground forces in Manila under Shimbu Group control for purposes of land combat was taken as early as 5 January. This was impelled by sudden concern that the objective of the enemy's Lingayen invasion convoy, then passing through Mindoro Strait, might be a point on southwestern Luzon close to Manila, and also by the fact that Southwest Area Fleet desired to transfer its headquarters immediately to Baguio to join the Area Army. A Southwest Area Fleet order was issued on 5 January to the Manila Naval Defense Force, specifying that it would henceforth act on orders from Lt. Gen. Yokoyama in all matters relating to ground operations. Upon the departure the same day of Southwest Area Fleet headquarters, a group of five staff officers, headed by Rear Adm. Kyugoro Shimamoto, Vice-Chief of Staff, remained behind in Manila to supervise operations of the Manila Naval Defense Force and to serve as liaison between the Force and Shimbu Group. (Statements by Col. Kobayashi, previously cited, Rear Adm. Kaoru Arima, Chief of Staff, Southwest Area Fleet, Comdr. Shigeichi Yamamoto, Staff Officer (Operations), Southwest Area Fleet and Lt. Comdr. Koichi Kayashima, Staff Officer (Operations), 31st Special Base Force.

62 The remaining Army troops in the zone assigned to the Manila Naval Defense Force had been placed under Rear Adm. Iwabuchi's command by a Shimbu Group order issued about 20 January. These troops comprised three provisional infantry battalions and some shipping troops. The provisional infantry battalion stationed on Corregidor had already been placed under Rear Adm. Iwabuchi's operational control late in December. (1) Statement by Lt. Comdr. Kayashima, previously cited. (2) Manila Naval Defense Force Operations Order No. 17, 21 Jan 45. XIV Corps ADVATIS Translation XIVCAET 0051, 9 Feb 45.

63 During late December and January, the Manila Naval Defense Force was strengthened by five provisional infantry battalions organized among the replacements, small combat elements, and other "loose ends" in the Manila area. Of nine such battalions organized, four were sent to the Kobayashi Force, one to the Kawashima Force, and four remained behind to be integrated into the Manila Naval Defense Force. The Kobayashi Force retained command over the 3d Surface Raiding Force located along the shores of Manila Bay northwest of the city. (Statement by Col. Kobayashi, previously cited.)

64 On or about 9 January, Lt. Gen. Yokoyama ordered the Noguchi Detachment to move from the Bicol Peninsula to the Manila area. By the end of January, the detachment headquarters, the 182d and the 185th Independent Infantry Battalions were en route, while the 1st Battalion, 26th Independent Mixed Regiment, scattered over northwestern Samar and the southern tip of Bicol, had not yet left for Manila. The 2d Battalion, 9th Infantry, newly attached to the Noguchi Detachment, was still on Samar. Maj. Gen. Noguchi planned to leave behind the 35th Air Sector Unit Hq., the 147th Airfield Battalion, and the 5th Surface Raiding Base Battalion to cooperate with the 35th Naval Garrison Unit in securing the Bicol Peninsula. (1) Statement by Maj. Gen. Susumu Noguchi, commander, 81st Infantry Brigade. (2) Dokuritsu Konsei Dai Nijuroku Rentai Kodo Gaiyo (Summary of Operations, 26th Independent Mixed Regiment) Home Depot Division, Sep 47. (3) 81st Infantry Brigade (Noguchi Detachment) Operations Order No. A-11, 13 Jan 45. Sixth U. S. Army ADVATIS Translation 6AAET 0447, 11 Apr 45.

65 Peripheral commands under the direct control of Shimbu Group included the Fuji Force in Batangas Province and the Kogure Detachment in the Lamon Bay area. The order of battle of the Shimbu Group (less the Manila Naval Defense Force) on 1 February was as follows:

(1) Hito Sakusen Kiroku Dai Sanki Dai Sankan Furoku Dai Ichi ManiraToho Shimhu Shudan no Sakusen (Philippine Operations Record, Phase Three, Vol. III Supplement 1: Shimbu Group Operations East of Manila) 1st Demobilization Bureau, Oct 46, pp. 61-2. (2) Manila Defense Force Operations Order No. A-25, to Jan 45, and Kobayashi Force Operations Order No. A-45, 2 Feb 45. XIV Corps ADVATIS Translation XIVCAET 0060, 13 Feb 45, and XIVCAET 0075, 25 Feb 45 . (3) Disposition Chart of Kuromiya Detachment, 31 Jan 45. XI Corps ADVATIS Translation XICAET 0049, 22 Mar 45. (4) Fuji Force Operations Order No. A-1, 1 Jan 45. XIV Corps ADVATIS Translation XIVCAET 0098, 20 Mar 45. (5) Statements by Maj. Gen. Osamu Kawashima, commander, 82d Infantry Brigade; Col. Kazuo Okita, commander, 186th Independ ent Infantry Battalion; Lt. Col. Nobutaka Kogure, commander, 1st Surface Raiding Base Force; and Lt. Col. Norio Tsutsumi, commander, 2d Surface Raiding Base Force.

66 This reorganization of forces in Manila was begun on 21 January, the same day that Rear Adm. Iwabuchi assumed operational control of Army forces in the city. On 3 February, Shimbu Group further strengthened Adm. Iwabuchi's hand by giving him absolute command of all Army forces in the Manila Naval Defense Force zone. (1) Manila Naval Defense Force Operations Order No. 17. XIV Corps ADVATIS Translation XIVCAET 0051, 9 Feb 45. (2) Shimbu Group Order, 3 Feb 45. Sixth U.S. Army ADVATIS Translation 6AAET 0376, 5 Mar 45.

67 The complete order of battle of the Manila Naval Defense Force on 1 February was as follows:

(1) Manila Naval Defense Force Operation Order No. 17. XIV Corps ADVATIS Translation XIVCAET 0051, 9 Feb 45. (2) Organization Chart of the Bay Entrance Defense Force. XI Corps ADVATIS Translation XICAET 0038, 26 Feb 45. (3) Manira Boei Butai Sento Jokyo (Manila Naval Defense Force Operations) 2d Demobilization Bureau, May 47, p. 21.

68 The principal participants, Col. Shujiro Kobayashi, who at that time was still senior operations staff officer of the Area Army headquarters but who was already slated to be assigned temporarily to Shimbu Group headquarters, and Lt. Comdr. Koichi Kayashima, operations staff officer, 31st Special Base Force, disagree regarding some elements of the discussions. Col. Kobayashi states that it was agreed upon that the forces in Manila would be expected to stem an enemy assault on the capital only for a brief period of days, after which they would withdraw to the main Shimbu positions to the east. Lt. Comdr. Kayashima remembers no specific reference to the withdrawal of the naval forces after a brief defense. He did question Col. Kobayashi regarding the location where the Shimbu Group proposed to employ the Manila naval forces if they were subsequently evacuated from Manila. Col. Kobayashi replied that the area around Antipolo would be selected. The Manila Naval Defense Force considered the Antipolo area unsatisfactory. There being a possibility that the Manila forces might be withdrawn to the east, the naval forces, on their own initiative, began to transfer surplus rations from Manila to the Wawa-Bosoboso sector early in January. Shimbu Group later accepted this arbitrary decision of the naval forces. (Statements by Col. Kobayashi and Lt. Comdr. Kayashima, both previously cited.)

69 When the Manila Naval Defense Force was orgnaized on 20 December, it numbered only 4,000 troops because Southwest Area Fleet then had under study a plan to transfer the bulk of naval forces located in Manila to the Clark Field area. The following day or so, the Area Fleet notified the Area Army that only 4,000 naval troops would remain in Manila. However, within a few days the Area Fleet decided against this plan in favor of incorporating the bulk of the naval forces then in Manila, into the Manila Naval Defense Force, raising the strength to 16,700. The Area Army, however, was not informed of this until about 6 January. The mission assigned on 20 December to the Manila Naval Defense Force was to defend the Nichols Field and Cavite sectors and those buildings and installations occupied by the naval forces in Manila. (1) Philippine Area Naval Operations, Part IV, op. cit., p. 11. (2) Statements by Col. Kobayashi, Rear Adm. Arima, and Comdr. Yamamoto, all previously cited. (3) Manila Naval Defense Force Operations Order No. 1 , 22 Dec 44. XIV Corps ADVATIS Translation XIVCAET 0061, 14 Feb 45.

70 In the series of conferences between 8-13 January, opinion was divided among those staff officers of the Southwest Area Fleet remaining in Manila with regard to the degree of resistance in the city. Those who advocated a firm defense, however, argued their views more strongly than those who were willing to accept a brief defense. (Statements by Col. Kobayashi, Comdr. Yamamoto, and Lt. Comdr. Kayashima, all previously cited; and Comdr. Takara Urabe, Staff Officer (Operations), Southwest Area Fleet, and Maj. Yorio Ishikawa, Staff Officer (Operations), Shimbu Group.

71 This order was communicated to staff representatives of all subordinate Shimbu Group commands at a conference at Lt. Gen. Yokoyama's headquarters. Lt. Comdr. Koichi Kayashima represented Rear Adm. Iwabuchi's command at the conference. Since leakage of the intention to withdraw after a brief defense might seriously impair the morale of the troops in Manila, this part of Lt. Gen. Yokoyama's plan was never included in formal orders issued by Shimbu commander. (Statements by Col. Kobayashi and Lt. Comdr. Kayashima, both previously cited.)

72 Although Shimbu Group was constantly in communication with Fourteenth Area Army headquarters at this time, very little information was obtained as to the progress of the operations in the north. Even less knowledge was available regarding the situation in the central Luzon plain and Clark Field sectors. (Statement by Col. Kobayashi, previously cited.)

73 Ibid.

74 Although the Shimbu Group was charged with responsibility for the sector east of the line Calumpit-Pampanga River-Licab-Guimba-San Antonio, this was interpreted to mean protecting the Manila-Cabanatuan highway from the guerrillas. No elements of the group were posted north of the Angat River inasmuch as the movement of personnel from Manila and the 105th Division along the road was considered adequate. Moreover, members of the Ganap, pro-Japanese political organizations, patrolled the road between Baliuag and Cabanatuan. Ibid.

75 A few ground units had destroyed the bridges and parts of the roads leading along the shore northwest into the city. The enemy was forced to come into the city along the road from Novaliches. Some units had been stationed on the outskirts of the city to send up flares if the enemy was seen approaching. Whether the men were asleep or were killed in a surprise attack is not known, but no signals were ever seen. Santo Tomas University, which had been used as an internment camp, was one of the first installations overrun by this task force in Manila. Follow ing negotiations with an American officer, Lt. Col. Hayashi, the Japanese commander, obtained permission to lead his unit out with what arms they could carry in exchange for the release of Allied internees held as hostages. They were taken by the American unit to the outskirts of Manila early 5 February and released. Lt. Col. Hayashi was subsequently killed in action. (Interrogation of Col. Kobayashi, previously cited.

76 Summary of Operations and Battle Lessons, Luzon Campaign, op. cit., p. 88.

77 The remnants of the Abe Provisional Infantry Battalion later withdrew south along Laguna de Bay and continued around the east shoreline to join the main body of the Shimbu Group in April. (Statement by Col. Hiroshi Hashimoto, Chief of Staff, Kobayashi Force.)

78 The 3d Surface Raiding Force, which had remained under command of Maj. Gen. Kobayashi and which had been by-passed by the enemy in his initial entry into Manila, now found itself under attack from the rear. The unit sought unsuccessfully to break through the enemy lines to join the main strength of the Shimbu Group in the hills east of Manila. During the fighting which followed, the entire unit was annihilated. Ibid.

79 About 880 troops completed this withdrawal. (Statement by Lt. Comdr. Kayashima, previously cited.)

80 By this date, 8 February, no reports had yet been received in Shimbu Group headquarters concerning the American attacks which had commenced against the Nichols Field positions on 6 February. (Statement by Col. Kobayashi, previously cited.)

81 After learning of this decision of the Shimbu Group commander, Lt. Comdr. Kayashima made no formal recommendation to the Shimbu headquarters regarding the withdrawal of the Japanese forces from Manila. Lt. Gen. Yokoyama, intending to order the withdrawal of the Manila Naval Defense Force depending upon the outcome of the planned counterattack, still made no reference to the evacuation of Manila. (Statements by Col. Kobayashi and Lt. Comdr. Kayashima, both previously cited.)

82 Lt. Comdr. Kayashima departed on the night of 10-11 February to return to Ft. McKinley. Lt. Comdr. Kayashima's truck was destroyed, however, during an enemy air attack, and he was compelled to return to Shimbu Group headquarters on the 11th. The plan was immediately transmitted by radio to Ft. McKinley and Manila. (Statement by Lt. Comdr. Kayashima, previously cited.)

83 (1) Several naval officers in Manila and Col. Katsuzo Noguchi, who had assumed command of all Navy and Army troops in Manila when Rear Adm. Iwabuchi left for Ft. McKinley, urgently requested a naval staff officer to return and control the naval forces in Manila. Ibid. (2) General Yamashita, having previously learned that Rear Adm. Iwabuchi had transferred from Manila to Ft. McKinley, was very disturbed when, on 13 February he received the report that the naval commander had returned to Manila. He immediately directed Lt. Gen. Yokoyama to order Rear Adm. Iwabuchi to withdraw his forces from the city. The Truth of the Philippines Campaign, op. cit., p. 35.

84 Statement by Lt. Comdr. Kayashima, previously cited.

85 Philippine Area Naval Operations, Part IV, op. cit., p. 29.

86 Statements by Col. Kobayashi and Lt. Comdr. Kayashima, both previously cited.

87 Statement by Col. Kobayashi, previously cited.

88 As a preliminary move in the attack, Lt. Gen. Yokoyama had ordered, 9 February, the Kawashima Force to move up the main force of the 31st Infantry to the vicinity of Novaliches. The regiment (less 3d Battalion) left its positions in the vicinity of Ipo on so February. (Statement by Col. Shimaji Kobayashi, commander, 31st Infantry Regiment.)

89 The 31st Infantry (less 3d Battalion) was preparing to renew the attack but, on 18 February, was ordered to withdraw to its main positions, completing the move on 21 February. Ibid.

90 Statement by Col. Hashimoto, previously cited.

91 Statement by Lt. Comdr. Kayashima, previously cited.

92 During the period 3-17 February, principally in the early phases of the Manila fighting, about 3500 additional miscellaneous naval personnel withdrew to Wawa. Ibid.

93 On 18 February, there having been no indication of an attempted withdrawal the preceding night, Lt. Gen. Yokoyama radioed the following to the Manila Naval Defense Force headquarters: "The counterattacks of the Kobayashi and Kawashima Forces will terminate on the night of 18 February. This will afford you a final opportunity to withdraw from Manila. Report direction and time of withdrawal." The reply of the same day stated, "With the intention of withdrawing from Manila we drafted a plan but later found that it was impossible to execute the withdrawal. If we attempt to withdraw we will be annihilated. On the other hand, if we remain in the city we will be able to hold the position for one more week. The most important problem is to hold your main positions as long as possible and to inflict maximum casualties on the enemy. It is the best way to defend to the last." Another message from Lt. Gen. Yokoyama on the same day stated as follows: "From experience gained during the Lingayen operations it is not difficult to penetrate the enemy's front lines during the night and retreat through his lines. Under unfavorable conditions the Manila Naval Defense Force headquarters, with some forces, should consider the possibillity of withdrawing by way of Hagonoy Isthmus or by boat across Manila Bay." Philippine Area Naval Operations, Part IV, op. cit., pp. 30-2.

94 Ibid., p. 39.

95 Organization Chart of the Bay Entrance Defense Force. XI Corps ADVATIS Translation XICAET 0038, 26 Feb 45.

96 Following its capture in 1942, Corregidor had been left in ruins until the end of September 1944 at which time the Japanese began to reinforce the garrison and rebuild the fortifications. Philippine Area Naval Operations, Part IV, op. cit., pp. 36-7.

97 An American convoy of two cruisers, one destroyer, and 17 transports entered Manila Bay on 1 March. Shukan Joho Dai Hyakujusan-go (Weekly Intelligence Reports No. 113) Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section, 10 Mar 45.

98 Philippine Operations Record, Phase Three, op. cit. Vol III Suppl. 1, p. 23.

99 Ibid., p. 2.

100 Statement by Lt. Comdr. Kayashima, previously cited.

101 Philippine Operations Record, Phase Three, op. Cit. Vol. III Suppl. 1, p. 25 and Attached Map No. 3.

102 These four battalions included the 31st Infantry (less 3d Battalion), which had been transferred from the Kawashima Force late in February and placed under direct command of the Shimbu Group, the 185th Independent Infantry Battalion, and one provisional battalion from a railway unit, both of which had just arrived from Bicol. (1) Kobayashi Force Operations Order No. A-124, 8 Mar 45. XI Corps ADVATIS Translation XICAET 0049, 22 Mar 45. (2) Statement by Col. Kobayashi, previously cited.

103 Philippine Operations Record, Phase Three, op. cit. Vol. III Suppl. 1 , pp. 25-6.

104 Philippine Area Naval Operations, Part IV, op. cit., pp. 62-3.

105 Shimbu Personnel Senior No. 50, 29 Mar 45. ADVATIS Bulletin No. 698, 5 Jan 45. This change had first been considered by Imperial General Headquarters about mid-December, but no decision was reached at that time. In January Fourteenth Area Army recommended to Imperial General Headquarters that the Shimbu Group be organized as an Army Headquarters. As a group commander appointed by General Yamashita, Lt. Gen. Yokoyama exercised only tactical control over troops assigned to the group. To have complete control, it was first necessary for the group to be recognized as an Army by Imperial General Headquarters, after which Lt. Gen. Yokoyama had to be appointed by the Emperor as commander of the Army.

106 Radio communication between Fuji Force and Forty-first Army ceased in late April. Philippine Operations Record, Phase Three, op. cit. Vol. III Suppl. 1, p. 32.

107 Ibid., p. 47.

108 This naval unit, composed of about 1,800 troops, was originally under command of the 31st Special Base Force in Manila. At the end of February, however, Southwest Area Fleet placed the 35th Naval Garrison Unit under command of the 33d Special Base Force on Cebu. (1) Senkyuhyakuyonjuyon oyobi Yonjugo Nen Zai Hito Nihon Gun Heiryoku (Strength of Japanese Forces in the Philippines, 1944-45) 1st and 2d Demobilization Bureaus, Nov-Dec 49. (2) Statement by Comdr. Kusumi, previously cited.

109 During the latter part of March and April, the main strength of the Bicol Detachment, which had been organized by Shimbu Group on 20 March 1945 and which included the Headquarters, 35th Air Sector Unit, the 147th Airfield Battalion and the 5th Surface Raiding Base Battalion, withdrew from the vicinity of Naga to previously prepared positions on Mt. Isarog, 11 miles to the east where the detachment remained until the end of the war. (1) 147th Airfield Battalion Operations Order No. 67, 22 Mar 45. XIV Corps ADVATIS Translation 165 LTD 0127, 12 May 45. (2) Philippine Operations Record, Phase Three, op. cit. Vol. III Suppl. 1, p. 48.

110 The only all weather route leading into Baguio, Highway 3 through Binalonan and Sison to the junction with Highway 11 at Camp One, had been severed during the first week of the ground fighting. Fourteenth Area Army had begun work early in January on a circuitous route winding about 60 miles through Trinidad to Inticak thence over a mountain trail to Kayapa where a carabao trail continued through Pingkian to Aritao. This particular trail was selected because it was believed to require the least effort to improve. Actually, however, the construction proved to be extremely difficult, particularly near the rice paddies and lowlands around Inticak and the steep grades southeast of Kayapa. No more than about one ton of supplies could be brought into Baguio each day at the beginning of February. Reserve supplies of food were already reaching a dangerously low level. It was mid-April before construction had progressed sufficiently to permit motor vehicles to travel the entire length. (1) Statement by Maj. Gen. Konuma, previously cited. (2) The Truth of the Philippines Campaign, op. cit., p. 35.

111 Another consideration for retaining a strong garrison at Aparri was the belief in Area Army that Japanese personnel might yet be transported to the Homeland aboard submarines, supplementing the air lift already operating at night from Tuguegarao and Echague. Imperial General Headquarters had dispatched a message to Fourteenth Area Army late in January ordering the evacuation to Japan of the maximum number of key personnel, such as pilots, engineers, and technicians, by every available means. On or about 10 February, three Japanese submarines left Takao, Formosa, for Batulinao, 30 miles east of Aparri. Two were sunk en route. The third returned to Formosa safely. This was the last submarine evacuation from the Philippines. (1) Statement by Col. Ichiji Sugita, Staff Officer (Operations), Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section. (2) Hito Homen ni okeru Sensuikan Sakusen.(Submarine Operations in the Philippine Area) 2d Demobilization Bureau, Dec 47, p. 36.

112 The Navy and Army were operating airlifts from Tuguegarao and Echague, respectively.

113 Following the departure of the Fourth Air Army headquarters for Formosa, 15 January, Fourteenth Area Army dealt directly with 4th Air Division. On 17 February, Imperial General Headquarters ordered the deactivation of the Fourth Air Army headquarters effective 28 February, at which time the 4th Air Division was incorporated into the Fourteenth Area Army order of battle. (1) Dairikumei ,Dai Sennihyakugojuhachi-go. (Imperial General Headquarters Army Order No. 1258) 17 Feb 45. (2) Hito Koku Sakusen Kiroku Dai Niki. (Philippine Air Operations Record, Phase Two) 1st Demobilization Bureau, Oct 46, pp. 133-4.

114 Takachiho is the name of a mountain in Kyushu on top of which, according to a Japanese legend, Prince Ninigi, ancestor of Emperor Hirohito, was told to descend from heaven.

115 The Bambang Branch, Fourteenth Area Army headquarters, had been established 18 January, under the command of Lt. Col. Makoto Nakahara. The scope of the duties assigned to the branch at that time, however, was limited to establishing the Bambang area on a self-sufficient basis insofar as supplies were concerned. By the Area Army order of 23 January, the mission was broadened to include tactical control of the 2d Armored, 10th and 105th Divisions. Area Army, however, still reserved the prerogative of making the major decisions. (1) Shobu Sakumei Ko Dai Yonh yakuyonjunana-go. (Fourteenth Area Army Operations Order No. A-447) 23 Jan 45. (2) Statement by Maj. Gen. Konuma, previously cited.

116 (1) Philippine Area Naval Operations, Part IV, op. cit., p. 66. (2) Statement by Maj. Gen Konuma, previously cited.

117 This Area Army order provided for the transfer to the 23d Division of the Hayashi Detachment, which had been organized by the 29th Division about 7 January from the 544th Independent Infantry Battalion and miscellaneous shipping units stationed in San Fernando, and the 1st Battalion, 75th Infantry, 19th Division. Other provisions of the order stipulated that the 2d Battalion, 73d Infantry, and 2d Battalion, 75th Infantry, were to be returned to the 19th Division after the completion of the withdrawal. Shobu Sakumei Ko Dai Gohyakujuroku-go. (Fourteenth Area Army Operations Order No. A-516) 13 Feb 45.

118 The redeployment had progressed sufficiently by 28 February for the Area Army on that date to fix the time for the assumption of command in the newly assigned areas as 1200, 5 March. Shobu Sakumei Ko Dai Gohyakugojuichi-go. (Fourteenth Area Army Operations Order No. A-551) 28 Feb 45.

119 Shobu Sakumei Ko Dai Gohyakujushichi-go. (Fourteenth Area Army Operations Order No. A-517) 13 Feb 45.

120 The 546th Independent Infantry Battalion was depleted to such an extent that the remnants were absorbed into the 379th Independent Infantry Battalion. A provisional infantry battalion was integrated into the 545th Independent Infantry Battalion to bring that unit back up to approximately full strength. Summary of 58th Independent Mixed Brigade Organization, 20 Feb 45. I Corps ADVATIS Translation ICAET 0177, 21 Apr 45.

121 Only two guard companies under the command of the Inspectorate of the Line of Communications stood between the enemy force and the new road. Both of these companies were stationed in the vicinity of Santa Rosa. (Statement by Maj. Gen. Konuma, previously cited.)

122 For further details regarding the operations in Salacsac Pass at this time see page 478.

123 Dokuritsu Konsei Dai Gojuhachi Ryodan (Mei) Butai Kodo Gaiyo [Summary of Operations, 58th Independent Mixed Brigade (Mei Force)] Home Depot Division, undated. Record of Operations and Movements of the 16th Reconnaissance Regiment. (pages unnumbered).

124 In addition to the mounting battle losses, for which the only replacements were untrained and inadequately armed service troops, the physical stamina of all troops was deteriorating sharply due to the progressive reduction in daily ration brought about by the shortage of food supplies. Moreover, the strain of continuous fighting against an enemy who had complete control of the air, unlimited supplies of artillery ammunition, and sufficient reserve units to permit rotation of the front line troops, was beginning to make itself felt among the Japanese troops. (Statements by Maj. Gen. Konuma, previously cited and Maj. Mitsusuke Tanaka, Staff Officer (Operations), Fourteenth Area Army.)

125 Philippine Operations Record, Phase Three, op. cit., Vol. III, Operations on Luzon, p. 164.

126 58th Independent Mixed Brigade Operations Order No. A-89, 10 Mar 45. I Corps-ADVATIS Translation ICAET 0177, 21 Apr 45.

127 Following the completion of this withdrawal, the Hayashi Detachment was dissolved. The 544th Independent Infantry Battalion thereupon took up positions in the main defense line at Sablan, replacing the 379th Independent In fantry Battalion which now concentrated on the north flank of the defense line. (Statement by Maj. Gen. Bunzo Sato, commander, 58th Independent Mixed Brigade.)

128 Japanese civilians residing in Baguio were ordered to evacuate to Bayombong, 30 March. Fourteenth Area Army Line of Communication Staff Transportation Special Order No. 7, 30 Mar 45. ADVATIS Bulletin No. 702, 7 Jun 45, p. 1.

129 Maj. Gen. Haruo Konuma, who was conducting the defense of Balete and Salacsac Passes at this time, visited Fourteenth Area Army headquarters in Baguio on 4-5 April. Upon seeing how discouraged the Japanese were in this sector he proposed sending a provisional infantry battalion from the Cagayan Valley to aid in the defense of Baguio. He immediately dispatched a message to his command post in Bambang, ordering one provisional battalion to depart for Baguio. Because of the poor condition of the Baguio-Aritao trail, however, only the headquarters and one company completed the entire march, arriving at Baguio 16 April. Following the withdrawal of the Japanese from Baguio, this battalion was ordered by Area Army to come under the command of the 2d Armored Division. (Statement by Maj. Gen. Konuma, previously cited.)

130 Fourteenth Area Army Operations Order, No. C-406, 10 Apr 45 in I Corps ADVATIS Translation 163d LDT 0205, 5 May 45.

131 Shobu Sakumei Ko Dai Roppyakuyonjushichi-go (Fourteenth Area Army Operations Order No. A-647) 13 Apr 45.

132 Statement by Maj. Gen. Sato, previously cited.

133 The Truth of the Philippines Campaign, op. cit., p. 46.

134 23d Division Operations Order Nos. A-253 and A-254, 19 Apr 45. I Corps ADVATIS Translation 1 63d LDT 0206, 4 May 45.

135 One battalion of the 23d Division was thrown into the line about 19 April, followed two days later by another battalion of the 23d Division. Finally, about 22 April, the 16th Reconnaissance Regiment main strength, which on 20 April was ordered to withdraw from the vicinity of Tebbo, was committed with no more success. (Statement by Maj. Gen. Sato, previously cited.)

136 Statement by Maj. Gen. Naokata Utsunomiya, Deputy-Chief of Staff, Fourteenth Area Army.

137 During the evacuation of Baguio, the 378th Independent Infantry Battalion was almost annihilated. All of the artillery pieces of the 23d Division and the 58th Independent Mixed Brigade were lost during the withdrawal. (1) Statement by Maj. Gen. Sato, previously cited. (2) Philippine Operations Record, Phase Three, op. cit. Vol. III, p. 186.

138 This same trail was referred to by the American forces as the Old Spanish Trail.

139 This estimate of the secondary attack was based on the premise that the enemy would attack up the more gradual slope north of Carranglan. Because of this more gradual slope the Japanese also considered the Suzuka Trail more difficult to defend. (Statement by Maj. Gen. Konuma, previously cited.)

140 Tetsu (10th Division) Operations Order No. A-67, 15 Jan 45. I Corps ADVATIS Translation ICAET 0185, 25 Apr 45 .

141 The outposts in front of the 63d Infantry were first strengthened following a 23 January order by which the Inoue (Provisional) Battalion was added to the Advance Force immediately after being transferred from the 105th Division. Shortly thereafter, the 2d Battalion, 10th Infantry, was removed from the division reserve and also assigned to the Advance Force. Early in February, the 359th Independent Infantry Battalion, 105th Division, which had just been attached to the 10th Division from the 2d Armored Division, was ordered to take up positions mid-way between Digdig and Carranglan to block a possible enemy attack on Highway 5 from Carranglan. On 7 February, because of persistent though relatively small scale enemy attacks north of San Nicolas and Santa Maria, the division issued an order which included the following provisions: a. 1st Battalion, 39th Infantry, will take up positions in Salacsac Pass, behind the 10th Reconnaissance Regiment. b. The division artillery unit will place about one battalion in the vicinity of Imugan and have it prepared to cooperate in the Salacsac Pass fighting. c. Main strength of the Fujikuro Force (provisional battalion of the Tsuda Detachment) will proceed to the Ambayabang River valley about five miles north of Salacsac and pacify the guerrillas in that area. (1) Tetsu (10th Division) Operations Order No. A-76, 23 Jan 45-I Corps ADVATIS Translation ICAET 0185, 25 Apr 45. (2) Statement by Maj. Gen. Sakae Tsuchiya, Chief of Staff, 10th Division. (3) Tetsu (10th Division) Operations Order No. A-95, 7 Feb 45. I Corps ADVATIS Translation ICAET 0185, 2 5 Apr 45. (4) Cf. n. 41.

142 Shobu Sakumei Ko Dai Gohyakunijuroku-go (Fourteenth Area Army Operations Order No. A-526) 16 Feb 45.

143 Tetsu (10th Division) Operations Order No. A-111, 19 Feb 45. I Corps ADVATIS Translation ICAET 0185, 25 Apr 45.

144 (1) Statement by Maj. Gen. Konuma, previously cited. (2) 63d Infantry Operations Order No. 83, 25 Feb 45.

145 Salacsac 2d Pass was the term applied by the Japanese to a saddle on the Villa Verde Trail between two prominent hills about two miles west of the village of Salacsac. The summit nearest Salacsac where the trail broke out into the open in the direction of Sante Fe was called Salacsac 1st Pass.

146 Tetsu (10th Division) Operations Order No. A-132, 3 Mar 45. I Corps ADVATIS Translation ICAET 0185, 25 Apr 45. I Corps ADVATIS Translation ICAET 0185, 25 Apr 45.

147 Shobu Ha Sakumei Ko Dai Nijuichi-go (Fourteenth Area Army, Bambang Branch, Operations Order No. A-21) 3 Mar 45.

148 The 2d Armored Division had reorganized the 6th and loth Tank Regiments and the division antitank unit into three infantry battalions. These were supported by the 2d Mobile Artillery Regiment, which by this time was reduced to a strength of approximately one artillery battalion. Total strength of the division numbered about 4300. (Statement by Lt. Col. Kawai, previously cited.

149 An attempt by the 2d Armored Division on 31 March to recapture the Salacsac 2d Pass failed to dislodge forward elements of the enemy force. Ibid.

150 Sbobu Ba Den Dai Sanbyakujushichi-go   (Fourteenth Area Army, Bambang Branch, Telegram No. 3171 12 Mar 45.

151 With the assignment of the Takachiho Unit to the Suzuka Trail sector, Col. Kenji Tokunaga, who was senior to Col. Den Tsuda, took over command of all Japanese forces in this area. (Statement by Maj. Gen. Konuma, previously cited.)

152 When, on 18 March, it was learned that the original reports had overestimated the size of the enemy force attacking in the Suzuka Trail area, the newly added reinforcements, last elements of which arrived on 20 March, were nevertheless left in that area. Ibid.

153 In the meantime, the Area Army, after temporarily weakening the loth Division by detaching three companies of the 63d Infantry to the 2d Armored Division, had augmented the strength, 8 March, by ordering the 10th Infantry (less 2d Battalion) to rejoin the 10th Division. Immediately upon arriving in the division area, 10-20 March, the 10th Infantry (less 2d and 3d Battalions) was assigned to the area between Highway 5 and the Suzuka Trail. The 3d Battalion was simultaneously attached to the 63d Infantry to further strengthen the defenses in Balete Pass. (1) Dai Ju Shidan (Tetsu Heidan) Shijitsu Shiryo [Historical Data, 10th Division (Tetsu Force)] Home Depot Division, 15 Feb 47. (2) Statement by Maj. Gen. Konuma, previously cited.

154 The Truth of the Philippines Campaign, op. cit., p. 50.

155 Statement by Maj. Gen. Tsuchiya, previously cited.

156 During the period from February to April the Bambang Branch, Area Army, had organized 24 provisional infantry battalions seven of which had been assigned to the 10th Division. (Statement by Maj. Gen. Konuma, previously cited.)

157 In the three month period ending 30 April the 2d Armored Division had been reinforced by the addition of six provisional infantry battalions. Ibid.

158 Statement by Lt. Col. Kawai, previously cited.

159 Fourteenth Area Army Operations Orders, op. cit: Outline of Future Operational Policy for Northern Luzon, 5 May 45.

160 The following preliminary steps had already been taken by the Area Army to concentrate its scattered forces closer to the site of the final stand: a. The Araki Force, which had been placed directly under the Area Army on 16 March, was now assembled in the Cervantes area whence it had been ordered about 19 April; b. The 103d Division had been ordered by Area Army, 27 April, to transfer its main strength to the Cauayan-Cabagan area, leaving in Aparri only the Yuguchi Detachment with a nuclear infantry strength of two battalions; c. The Bayombong Naval Defense Force had been placed under command of the 105th Division on 1 April for land operations. (1) Shobu Sakumei Ko Dai Gohyakushichijushichi-go (Fourteenth Area Army Operations Order No. A-577) 16 Mar 45. (2) Dai Hyakusan Shidan (Shun) Butai Kodo Gaiyo [Summary of Operations, 103d Division (Shun Force)] Home Depot Division, undated. (3) Shobu Sakumei Ko Dai Roppyakukyu-ju-go (Fourteenth Area Army Operations Order No. A-690) 27 Apt 45. (4) 103d Division Operations Order No. A-283, 1 May 45. I Corps ADVATIS Translation 163 LDT 0274, 22 Jun 45. (5) Shobu Sakumei Ko Dai Roppyakunijuichi-go (Fourteenth Area Army Operations Order No. A-621) 31 Mar 45.

161 Fourteenth Area Army Operations Order No. A-750, 13 May 45. XIV Corps ADVATIS Translation 165 LDT 0143, 8 Jul 45.

162 Statement by Maj. Gen. Konuma, previously cited.

163 Historical Data, 10th Division (Tetsu Force), op. cit.

164 Statement by Lt. Col. Kawai, previously cited.

165 (1) Kawashima Force Operations Order No. A-146 (Shimbu Group Operations Order No. A-228 4 May 45. XI Corps ADVATIS Translation 164 LDT 0080, 24 May 45. (2) Kobayashi Force Operations Order No. A-244, 4 May 45. XI Corps ADVATIS Translation 164 LDT 0082, 27 May 45.

166 Ibid., (Kobayashi Force Operations Order No. A-244.

167 Statement by Maj. Noriaki Akutsu, Staff Officer (Intelligence), attached to Kawashima 105th Division, Force.

168 Ibid.

169 Ibid.

170 Statement by Col. Hashimoto, previously cited.

171 Statement by Lt. Col. Kogure, previously cited.

172 In the meantime, the major strength of the Western Naval Unit had arrived at Infanta early in May. Food supplies were insufficient, however, to feed both naval forces. On 8 May, therefore, the Western Naval Force was ordered to disband and melt into the hills. Some of these service elements began drifting north along the coast while others moved south toward Laguna de Bay.

173 Rear Adm. Furuse's promotion from captain was effective on 1 May.

174 Philippine Area Naval Operations, Part IV, op. cit., p. 61.

175 The Noguchi Force was ordered to transfer its main strength to the mountainous region along the east shore of Laguna de Bay where some of its elements were already located. The Kobayashi Force was ordered to establish a defensive sector in the area north of Mt. Purro and east of Wawa. The 31st Infantry (less 3d Battalion) and miscellaneous troops of the 8th Division were ordered to take up positions north of the Lenatin River. The remnants of the Kawashima Force, already withdrawing from the Ipo Dam area, were ordered to move to the mountains east of San Miguel (22 miles northwest of Ipo) where food was more plentiful. This transfer later proved impossible and the main part of the Kawashima Force remained in the area centering about Mt. Inuman. Philippine Operations Record, Phase Three, op. cit. Vol. III Suppl. I, pp. 36-8 and attached Map No. 4.

176 Philippine Operations Record, Phase Three, op. Cit. Vol. III, pp. 228-30.

177 Statement by Maj. Gen. Utsunomiya, previously cited.

178 The Tank Annihilating Unit, with a strength of about 400, was organized from the Fourteenth Area Army Training Unit. The mission of this unit was to make close-in attacks against enemy tanks with antitank mines. (State ment by Maj. Gen. Konuma, previously cited.)

179 Of the 20 tanks remaining in the 2d Armored Division after the fighting around San Jose these 12 were the only operational tanks by June. The guns had been removed from the other eight tanks and emplaced in the defenses in Salacsac Pass. (Statement by Lt. Col. Kawai, previously cited.)

180 Lt. Gen. Okamoto, whose staff officer did not return from the Aritao rendezvous, began moving his division, 10 June, on his own initiative toward Kasibu where he planned to establish a base from which the division could raid the enemy supply routes. After reaching Kasibu, however, the 10th Division was attacked by an enemy force advancing from the direction of Bambang late in July. The division again withdrew, this time to the upper valley of the Cagayan River. (1) Historical Data, 10th Division (Tetsu Force), op. cit. (2) Statement by Maj. Gen. Tsuchiya, previously cited.

181 The main strength of the toad Division was disposed approximately as follows at this time:

Summary of Operations, 103d Division (Shun Force), op. cit.

182 The division commander also lost contact with the major portion of his subordinate commands at this time. Ibid.

183 Philippine Operations Record, Phase Three, op. cit. Vol. III, pp. 240-3.

184 Statement by Col. Atsutaka Saruwatari, Chief of Staff, 4th Air Division.

185 The Yuguchi Detachment was ordered on 13 June to abandon Aparri and move to Tuguegarao and secure that area. Before the detachment could reach that vicinity, however, an enemy column moving north on Highway 5 attacked the 177th Independent Infantry Battalion, reinf., which was garrisoning that area, and drove it northeast into the hills. Here the remnants of the Tuguegarao garrison were joined by the Yuguchi Detachment. Summary of Operations, 103d Division (Shun Force), op. cit.

186 The 2d Armored Division subsequently arrived in the area south of Antipolo during the early part of July. (Statement by Lt. Col. Kawai, previously cited.)

187 In early April, the 73d Infantry, 19th Division, reinforced by the 359th Independent Infantry Battalion, 103d Division, succeeded in driving the guerrillas back from the Tacbo area. During April, however, the guerrillas were reinforced to such an extent that the 19th Division found it necessary to strengthen still further the defenses in that vicinity. Accordingly, the 76th Infantry (less 2d and 3d Battalions) was dispatched to the pass early in May. As the guerrilla strength continued to increase, the difficulty of supplying the Japanese forces also increased until they were finally compelled to withdraw in June. (Statement by Lt. Gen. Yoshiharu Ozaki, commander, 19th Division.)

188 3d Battalion, 73d Infantry, Operations Order No. A-65, 12 Jun 45. XIV Corps ADVATIS Translation 165 LDT 0150, 19 Jul 45 .

189 Philippine Operations Record, Phase Three, op. cit. Vol. III, p. 245.

190 Statement by Maj. Gen. Utsunomiya, previously cited.

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